CHAPTER 1
Freedom of Expression in Canada

LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter, you will understand:

☐ The history of freedom of expression and the media’s right to report the news in Canada.

☐ The scope and impact of section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, including “freedom of the press and other media of communication.”

☐ The role of the courts in defining the limits on freedom of expression and in striking a balance between the media’s right to report the news and competing rights and interests.

☐ The open courts principle and the right of journalists to cover the justice system.

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Introduction
When a special Senate committee was struck in 1969 to investigate the concentration of ownership in the Canadian media, journalists across the country were asked to define freedom of the press. The committee’s final report notes there was consensus on two points. One, the press enjoys the same freedoms as any member of the public, and “press freedom is simply an extension of freedom of speech.” Two, government interference poses “the gravest potential threat” to this freedom. “When a government seeks to restrict the freedoms of its citizens,” the committee warned, “the press is always its first target.”¹ And when these attacks have occurred, the first line of defence has been Canada’s courts.

Today, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*\(^2\) guarantees the right of freedom of expression for all Canadians. Journalists, performers, artists, musicians, advertisers, political activists, concerned citizens—anyone with an agenda to promote or an opinion or point of view to express has the right to be heard. Freedom of expression, however, is not absolute. Governments can pass laws limiting free speech if the restriction is reasonable and in keeping with the freedoms afforded to the citizens of a democratic state. Our Constitution also specifically protects freedom of the press and other media of communication, a recognition of the media’s special role in ensuring that the public is informed and government institutions and the courts are accountable.

Why do Canadians consider freedom of expression to be one of their fundamental rights? How did journalists free themselves from government-imposed restrictions on their work? And how has the Charter transformed the right of the media—and the freedom of all citizens—to debate, expose, and criticize? This is a story almost as old as the country itself.

**"An Unshackled Press"**

It has been hailed as “the most momentous freedom-of-the-press precedent” in early Canadian journalism.\(^3\) On New Year’s Day 1835, *The Novascotian* published a letter accusing the magistrates in charge of Halifax’s police department, poor asylum, and other services of pocketing £1,000 a year at the expense of the “poor and distressed.” The missive, signed with the pseudonym “The People,” went on to claim that three of these officials had been fleecing the public purse for three decades. It was a brazen attack, even for an era when reputations regularly took a drubbing in the press. The outraged magistrates struck back, urging Nova Scotia’s attorney general to charge *The Novascotian*’s proprietor, Joseph Howe, with criminal **libel**. In the legal jargon of the time, he stood accused of “wickedly, maliciously and seditiously desiring and intending to stir up and excite discontent among His Majesty’s subjects.”

After lawyers told Howe that his case was hopeless—the newspaper’s rabble-rousing motives were clear and truth was not yet recognized as a defence to libel—he chose to represent himself at trial. Howe’s courageous stand against the colonial powers of the day has become the stuff of legend. For more than six hours he regaled the jury with fresh allegations of civic corruption. One magistrate was using the city prison as his private larder, storing vegetables in the cells, and forcing inmates to make shoes for his family. The director of the poor asylum, another magistrate, was furnishing the institution with inferior, overpriced supplies. Howe ended his speech by challenging the jurors “to leave an unshackled press as a legacy to your children.” Spectators peppered the speech

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with applause. One juryman was moved to tears. Despite the judge’s stern reminder of
the jurors’ duty to follow the law and to find Howe guilty, they returned in ten minutes
with an acquittal. Howe and his supporters paraded through the streets in triumph; six
magistrates promptly resigned in disgrace. In the next edition of The Novascotian, Howe
declared that “the press of Nova Scotia is free.”4 While Howe’s victory struck a blow for
freedom of the press, it was the culmination of a struggle that had begun in the 1750s,
with the publication of the first newspaper in the British colonies that would become
Canada.

The Early Press

In 1752, Boston printer John Bushell published the first edition of the Halifax Gazette. The
Gazette and other papers of the day were modest undertakings, typically two- or four-
page weeklies that devoted most of their columns to official government announcements
and European news, some of it months old and reprinted from foreign papers brought in
on merchant ships.5 These early papers have been regarded as little more than agents of
the government, subservient and dependent for their survival on official advertising and
printing contracts. “Because the printer-editor needed government business, he carefully
avoided comment on the conduct of those in authority,” notes one history of the Canadian
media.6 But closer examination of the surviving issues of these early papers shows their
proprietors did publish criticism of local administrations and the British government.
Bushell, for instance, waded into a power struggle between Nova Scotia’s military gover-
nor and merchants demanding the creation of an elected assembly; he published a letter
in 1753 with a pointed reference to the lack of business sense among those “brought up
in the military Way.” He also republished attacks on the British government that were
gleaned from imported opposition newspapers.7 In 1765 Bushell’s successor, Anthony
Henry, mounted a campaign against Britain’s Stamp Act duties on paper and provided
Gazette readers with extensive coverage of anti-tax protests in the American colonies.8
These flashes of independent reporting met with some official backlash—Henry was
warned to tone down his rhetoric or risk losing government printing contracts—and
became less frequent in the aftermath of the American Revolution. An influx of Loyalist

4 For accounts of Howe’s trial, see Dean Jobb, Bluenose Justice: True Tales of Mischief, Mayhem and
Trial of Joseph Howe” (Spring 1974) 3:2 Acadiensis 27-44.
5 See Marjory Whitelaw, First Impressions: Early Printing in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Nova Scotia
Museum, 1987) at 6-11.
6 Kesterton, supra note 3 at 9.
7 Dean Jobb, “‘The First That Ever Was Publish’d in the Province’: John Bushell’s Halifax Gazette,
8 John Bartlet Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony During the Revo-
lutionary Years (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1969) at 135-41.
refugees in the 1780s and the creation of new British colonies led to the establishment of official newspapers in colonial capitals, operated by more compliant, government-appointed King's Printers.9

In the 19th century, colonial governments relied on prosecutions for criminal libel to squelch criticism that might undermine their authority. Between 1786 and Joseph Howe's trial in 1835, a succession of newspaper publishers and activists were prosecuted and many were convicted, fined, or jailed. Halifax pamphleteer William Wilkie, for one, was sentenced to two years at hard labour in 1820 for alleging corruption in Nova Scotia's courts and government. In 1828 the publisher of the Canadian Freeman in York, Francis Collins, served 11 months behind bars for libelling Upper Canada's attorney general.10

Over time this draconian approach would give way to the concept of a free press as an underpinning of democracy. In 1792 British juries were given the right to decide not only if a statement had been published, but also whether it should be considered libellous.11 The same approach was instituted in the United States in 1805.12 It would be decades before Canada's laws caught up but, as Howe's trial made clear, juries were not averse to taking matters into their own hands. Howe's acquittal was a turning point, making colonial officials across British North America wary of using the criminal law to try to stifle their critics, since a libel trial might do little more than provide a public forum for airing allegations and grievances. By 1848, in the words of Nova Scotia Lieutenant Governor Sir John Harvey, that colony's press was "as free as that of England, claiming and enjoying in fact the same privileges."13

The growing power and independence of the press in Britain and the United States had inevitably spilled over into Canada. The official "gazettes" were joined in the 19th century by upstarts that provided a forum for local news, political debate, and the airing of democratic ideas. William Lyon Mackenzie attacked Upper Canada's "Family Compact" in the pages of his Colonial Advocate, while Howe used his Novascotian to demand constitutional reforms and responsible government. By the 1830s, notes media historian Paul Rutherford, "the very number of journals and journalists had made the press a force in the politics of the land."14 Newspapers took either a Tory or a radical bent, evolving into

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9 This was the pattern in New Brunswick (1785), Nova Scotia (1788), Prince Edward Island (1788), and Upper Canada (1791). See biographies of Christopher Sower, Anthony Henry, James Robertson, and Louis Roy in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, online: <http://www.biographi.ca>.
10 See ibid, biographies of Wilkie and Collins.
11 For an account of the struggle to liberalize Britain's law of criminal libel, see Lord Denning, Landmarks in the Law (London: Butterworths, 1984) at 283-97.
13 Quoted in DC Harvey, "Newspapers of Nova Scotia, 1840-1867" (1945) 26:3 Can Historical Rev 279 at 282.
pro-Conservative and pro-Liberal factions of the press that dominated Canadian journalism in the decades after Confederation. Papers were, by one account, “blatantly partisan and often hysterical … designed to pump propaganda into the national bloodstream.”\(^{15}\) Writers and editors attacked their political opponents with glee as they launched or promoted their own political careers.

**The Press in the 20th Century**

In the 20th century, the press broke free of its partisan fetters. Newspaper and magazine circulation climbed as increasing literacy and the advent of broadcasting brought new audiences. As news went mainstream, its readers, listeners, and viewers demanded more than political posturing and partisan bickering. By the mid-20th century, if a newspaper’s editorial columns endorsed a party or candidate it was on the basis of platforms and policies rather than blind allegiance. Media outlets and their writers and editors came to see themselves as independent agents with a duty to safeguard and promote the public interest.\(^{16}\) “Every man and woman will be better off if the transmission and reception of fact and opinion are left free from the intervention of government,” the *Montreal Daily Star*’s editor, George V Ferguson, declared in 1955. “The general will of a political society cannot be fully expressed without this freedom. Freedom of information thus becomes an essential part of any system of democracy.”\(^{17}\)

**The Courts and Freedom of Expression**

**Pre-Charter Rulings: The Battle for Freedom of Expression**

Desperate times call for desperate measures, and the hardships created by drought and economic depression in Western Canada made the 1930s one of those times. In Alberta, a Social Credit government headed by Bill Aberhart, an evangelical radio preacher, swept to power on a promise to pay residents a $25-a-month “dividend” to kick-start the economy. Social credit theory was considered dubious and Aberhart’s policies were subjected to sharp criticism in the province’s newspapers, which became the main political opposition. Aberhart, who dismissed newspapers as “mad dog operations” and “the mouthpiece of the financiers,” introduced legislation to bring the press under the government’s thumb.

An Act to ensure the publication of accurate news and information, or the Press Bill, as it was known, was an Orwellian law designed to enforce the government’s version of the facts. Under the legislation, the government could demand that newspapers publish an official statement in response to any published report about a Social Credit decision.

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16 This transformation is examined in Kesterton, supra note 3 at 222-26.
or policy. Furthermore, anyone who was maligned in the official corrections was barred from suing the government for defamation. The bill also enabled the government to force newspapers to reveal their sources and to identify the author of any article, editorial, or letter appearing in their pages. Any newspaper that disobeyed such orders could be shut down, possibly for good. One observer did not exaggerate when he termed Aberhart’s proposals “authoritarianism in its most overt form.”

The federal government, contending that the bill and other Social Credit measures were unconstitutional, referred the legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada for a ruling. The court found that the Press Bill was a clear attack on press freedom, but the court also acknowledged that the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act), the constitution of the day, afforded no right to freedom of speech or expression. Fortunately, the Supreme Court found other means to strike down legislation that it considered “retrograde” and “autocratic.” In March 1938 it declared the Press Bill ultra vires (beyond the jurisdiction and powers granted to provinces under the BNA Act) and an infringement on the federal government’s responsibility for the criminal law. The court ruled that the Criminal Code already outlawed seditious libels calling for rebellion or an overthrow of the government, and that a provincial government did not have the power to criminalize the legitimate criticism and healthy political debate that the newspapers provided. The Press Bill, it opined, would stifle this debate and criticism.

Despite the BNA Act’s silence on the real issue at stake, the court made some forceful pronouncements on the importance of freedom of speech in a democracy. Chief Justice Lyman Duff described the “right of free public discussion of public affairs” as “the breath of life for parliamentary institutions.” But freedom of speech in Canada was not an absolute right—citizens and journalists alike who defamed others or spread sedition, he noted, would face the legal consequences. A fellow judge, Justice Lawrence Cannon, was just as adamant that a free exchange of views on political issues is

   essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic State; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the right of the people to be informed through sources independent of the government concerning matters of public interest. There must be an untrammelled publication of the news and political opinions of the political parties contending for ascendancy.

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18 Kesterton, supra note 3 at 230.
19 British North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act), 30-31 Vict, c 3 (UK).
20 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
21 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] SCR 100 at 133.
22 Ibid at 145-46.
In the 1950s Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme Court produced a pair of significant rulings on freedom of speech. In a 1951 judgment that narrowed the legal definition of “sedition,” Rand declared that “freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every conceivable subject, are the essence of our life.” The second ruling arose from the so-called Padlock Law that the Quebec government passed in 1937 to combat the spread of communism. The legislation gave the province’s attorney general the power to lock up any home or building used to “propagate communism or bolshevism by any means whatsoever.” It was also an offence to print or distribute newspapers or other publications containing communist propaganda. Although the implications for freedom of speech and a free press were obvious, the law did not come before the Supreme Court for review until the mid-1950s, when a lawsuit between a tenant and the owner of a padlocked apartment reached Ottawa on appeal.

The court once again cited the constitutional division of powers between the provincial governments and the federal government, ruling in 1957 that the Padlock Law was

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a criminal measure and beyond the jurisdiction of the Quebec legislature. Rand, like
Duff almost two decades earlier, described freedom of speech as “little less vital to man’s
mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence.” Rand went on to emphasize
the link between democracy and freedom of speech:

Whatever the deficiencies in its workings, Canadian government is in substance the will
of the majority expressed directly or indirectly through popular assemblies. This means
ultimately government by the free public opinion of an open society. … But public opinion,
in order to meet such a responsibility, demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed
access to and diffusion of ideas.24

A colleague, Justice DC Abbott, expressed the view—a bold one for the time—that
even Parliament was powerless to fully abrogate the public’s right to free speech. “The
right of free expression of opinion and of criticism, upon matters of public policy and
public administration, and the right to discuss and debate such matters, whether they be
social, economic or political,” he argued, “are essential to the working of a parliamentary
democracy such as ours.”25

Three years after the Padlock Law was struck down in 1960, the government of Prime
Minister John Diefenbaker introduced a Canadian Bill of Rights.26 Section 1 set out an
array of human rights and fundamental freedoms that have “existed and shall continue
to exist” in Canada, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press. As an act of
Parliament, however, the Canadian Bill of Rights did not form part of the Constitution
and applied only to federal laws.27 However, the Canadian Bill of Rights set the stage for
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the kind of constitutional protection
of free speech that Abbott had envisioned in the 1950s. “Canadian judges have always
placed a high value on freedom of expression as an element of parliamentary democracy,”
notes one constitutional scholar, “and have sought to protect it with the limited tools
that were at their disposal.”28 The Charter has given the courts a new tool to protect and
expand freedom of expression.

24 Switzman v Elbling and AG of Quebec, [1957] SCR 285 at 306. Rand J used similar language to
stress the importance of freedom of expression in Saumur v City of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299 at
330. For an analysis of Rand J’s contribution to the development of freedom of speech and other
democratic rights, see William Kaplan, Canadian Maverick: The Life and Times of Ivan C Rand
25 Switzman, supra note 24 at 326. For a discussion of Abbott J’s ruling, see Robert Martin, Media
Law (Concord, Ont: Irwin Law, 1997) at 20.
26 Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44.
27 Robert Martin & G Stuart Adam, eds, A Sourcebook of Canadian Media Law (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1991) at 70.
28 Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1985) at 713.
Freedom of Expression Under the Charter
Defining the Scope of Free Speech

Thomas Jefferson best summed up American attitudes toward freedom of speech when he described government as “the opinion of the people.” If he ever faced a choice between “government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government,” he added, “I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.”29 The First Amendment to the US Constitution, ratified in 1791, sets out the fundamental freedoms of American citizens, among them a declaration that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” In the 20th century, US courts invoked this right to give journalists wide latitude to gather news and to protect the media against laws, government policies, and judicial rulings that inhibit the publication of information.30

Canadian courts, in contrast, are newcomers to the business of defining the scope of free speech. It wasn’t until 1982 that the Charter appeared, guaranteeing “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other

Figure 1.1 While Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau looks on, Queen Elizabeth signs Canada’s constitutional proclamation on April 17, 1982, bringing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and its protection of the freedom of the press, to life.

media of communication.” The guarantee, set out in section 2(b), is broad, suggesting that the framers of the Charter intended a wide array of forms of expression to fall within its scope. The guarantee was also drafted to encompass the press—a term that includes television and radio as well as traditional print journalism—and all other “media of communication.” Books, plays, television documentaries, websites, videos, DVDs, Internet chat groups, online magazines, social-networking sites, new forms of media technology yet to be invented—whatever the medium, Canadians are free to publish and disseminate images and ideas, subject only to laws and government restrictions that can be justified under section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 states:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The Supreme Court of Canada has taken the view that the right to free expression was entrenched in the Constitution “to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream.” Expression, the court has said, must be given a broad definition, embracing both verbal and physical means of communication. “The content of expression can be conveyed through an infinite variety of forms of expression: for example, the written or spoken word, the arts, and even physical gestures or acts.” Even the act of illegal parking could be a form of expression if the driver was engaged in a protest against unfair parking restrictions. In the court’s view, “activity is expressive if it attempts to convey meaning.” A firm line is drawn, however, at threats or acts of violence, which the court has repeatedly said will not be granted Charter protection. “A murderer or rapist cannot invoke freedom of expression in justification of the form of expression he has chosen.”

In 1992 Justice Beverley McLachlin, later the court’s chief justice, summarized the interests protected under section 2(b) as “truth, political or social participation, and self-fulfilment.” Freedom of expression is a right enjoyed not only by those making a statement, but also by those reading it or seeing it. In the words of media law expert Robert Martin, the Charter protects “a process … that extends from gathering information to publishing information, to selling and distributing information, and finally to receiving information.”

31 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 968.
32 Ibid at 968-70.
33 Ibid at 970. See also RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573 at 588.
36 Martin, supra note 25 at 39.
Political Expression

In Charter rulings on freedom of expression, the Supreme Court of Canada has reiterated its earlier pronouncements on the importance of free speech to Canadian democracy. It is nothing less than “one of the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of the political, social and educational institutions of western society.”37 In the view of Justice Peter Cory, writing in a 1989 judgment on media rights:

"Indeed a democracy cannot exist without that freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. The concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be over-emphasized."

Justice Gérard La Forest endorsed that view in a 1996 ruling, calling open discussion about government policies and practices “crucial to any notion of democratic rule. The liberty to criticize and express dissentient views has long been thought to be a safeguard against state tyranny and corruption.”39 In one application of this facet of freedom of expression, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 2009 that municipal transit authorities do not have the power to ban political advertisements from the sides of buses.40 Political expression, however, has its limits. In 2004 the Supreme Court upheld limits on how much money so-called third parties—individuals and groups not affiliated with the major political parties—can spend on advertising in federal elections. The law also imposes an advertising blackout on polling day. Although these provisions of the Canada Elections Act41 clearly restrict freedom of political expression, a majority of the court ruled that the limits were justified because they “create a level playing field” and prevent wealthy interests from having an undue influence on voters and, potentially, on the outcome of an election.42

Commercial Expression

Under the Charter, freedom of expression is no longer limited to the political realm. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Charter protects commercial advertising, including advertising aimed at children.43 It also protects the right of union members to stage most

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37 RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, supra note 33 at 583.
38 Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General), supra note 35 at 1336.
43 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec, supra note 31.

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forms of peaceful picketing during labour disputes.44 This right to freedom of commercial speech may also limit the ability of governments to ban or regulate the distribution of spam email messages.45 It does not, however, prevent a municipal government from using a noise by-law to prevent a commercial enterprise from employing a loudspeaker to attract customers to its premises.46

**Obscenity and Child Pornography**

Certain forms of pornography have won Charter protection from being prosecuted as obscenity under the *Criminal Code*, but the Supreme Court has ruled that freedom of expression does not extend to depictions of explicit sex with violence, degrading or dehumanizing treatment, or the exploitation of children.47 The offence of possession of child pornography has been upheld as a reasonable limit on free expression under section 1 of the Charter, with the exception of certain written or visual material created for personal use.48

**Hate Propaganda**

The court has had some difficulty grappling with the rights of those accused of spreading hate propaganda. In the case of Jim Keegstra, the Alberta schoolteacher charged under the *Criminal Code* with promoting hatred against an identifiable group,49 the court ruled that the anti-Semitic views he was foisting on his students were “repugnant” but, since they conveyed meaning, they fit the Charter definition of expression. But Keegstra’s ravings about Jewish plots were so extreme and so far removed from the core values of freedom of expression—the quest for truth, individual self-fulfillment, and participation in social and political life—that the law could stand as a reasonable limit on free speech.50

Ernst Zündel was more fortunate. A prominent Holocaust denier based in Toronto, he was charged with promoting hatred under a section of the *Criminal Code* that made it an offence to publish a false “statement, tale or news” that is likely to cause damage or mischief to a public interest.51 There was no question that Zündel’s pamphlet *Did Six Million Really Die?* was a form of expression, and the Charter protects the rights of minorities to voice opinions. The Supreme Court ruled that this infringement on freedom

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46 Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc, 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 SCR 141.
49 *Criminal Code*, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 319(3)(a).
51 *Criminal Code*, supra note 49, s 181.
of expression could not be justified, even though Zündel’s published views were untrue. Constitutional protection must extend to such statements, since determining precisely what is true and what is false can be a difficult and subjective exercise. A majority of the court struck down the law against spreading false news as unconstitutional.52

**Freedom of Expression and the Media**

The Charter’s explicit protection of “freedom of the press and other media of communication” begs a question: Do writers, publishers, and broadcasters, who make their living expressing themselves, enjoy special constitutional status? The Supreme Court has taken the view that freedom of the press and other media stands apart from the free-expression rights of ordinary citizens. In a 1988 judgment Justice Antonio Lamer, who later became chief justice, described freedom of the press as “an important and essential attribute of a free and democratic society,” and cautioned that “measures which prohibit the media from publishing information deemed of interest obviously restrict that freedom.”53 The court has also underscored the link between press freedom and the open exchange of information and ideas in a democratic society, stating: “It is the media that, by gathering and disseminating news, enable members of our society to make an informed assessment of the issues which may significantly affect their lives and well-being.”54 Justice Beverley McLachlin, in a dissenting judgment arising from a police search of media offices, contended that the Charter “affirms the special position of the press and other media in our society.” In her opinion, the guarantee of freedom of the press “must be interpreted in a generous and liberal fashion.”55 A Canadian professor who has studied freedom of expression in Canada and the United States has disputed this view. Freedom of the press, Richard Moon has argued, “is simply an aspect or implication of freedom of expression.” But, Moon concedes, “even in the absence of a special press provision, protection of press ‘autonomy’ may follow from the central role of the press in facilitating public debate and the exchange of information.”56

The free-expression rights of the print media may stand apart when it comes to gaining access to the public platform needed to exchange ideas. In a pre-Charter case, the Supreme Court ruled that newspapers are not obliged to carry every advertisement submitted for publication. Because the press is free to disseminate views and to select the information it reports, it follows that newspapers have the right to refuse to publish material as they choose.57 The Charter may yet change this. Adbusters Media Foundation

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52 R v Zundel, supra note 34.
53 Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 122 at 129.
57 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v Vancouver Sun, [1979] 2 SCR 435.
won the right in 2009 to sue the CBC and the Global Television Network for refusing to broadcast its advertisements, which promote “Buy Nothing Day,” “TV Turn-Off Week,” and other campaigns to reduce consumption and consumer spending. In allowing Ad-busters’ action to proceed, British Columbia’s Court of Appeal noted the argument can be made that broadcasters, public and private alike, “have been given the power to control expression in a public space” and must comply with the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression. The court said the issue would have to be settled at a future trial.\(^58\)

The era of fiercely independent journalists who owned their own printing presses—the likes of Joseph Howe and William Lyon Mackenzie—is long gone. The news business is now dominated by large corporations. By 2003 two media giants—CanWest Global Communications and Quebecor—owned one out of every two daily newspapers sold in Canada, accounting for 16 million papers every week (CanWest’s National Post and other big-city dailies were sold in 2010 to Postmedia Network Inc, making it Canada’s largest newspaper chain). While the Crown-owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation operates the country’s largest radio network, ten private companies together operate two-thirds of the country’s radio stations. CBC Television and Radio-Canada compete with three privately owned national networks, two broadcasting in English and one in French. This concentration of ownership and the media’s power to mould and influence public opinion have been the subject of three federal inquiries since 1969; the latest, an investigation by a Senate committee, filed a report in 2006 recommending stricter monitoring of broadcast licences and automatic investigations of most mergers involving media companies.\(^59\)

Although these inquiries have heard and expressed concerns about the concentration of media ownership in fewer and fewer hands, the federal government has been reluctant to take any action that could interfere with the media’s hard-won independence.\(^60\)

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60 To date, Ottawa’s only response has been to temporarily prevent newspaper proprietors from owning a television or radio station in the same city. See Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, “Part II: The State of the Canadian News Media” in Interim Report on the Canadian News Media (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2004) at 30-31.
Broadcast Restrictions and the Role of the CRTC

Canada’s electronic media are in a different position. As in most countries, broadcast frequencies are considered public property and their use by radio and television stations is a privilege, not a right. A federal agency, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), regulates the broadcasting industry and issues renewable licences for the use of specific frequencies. These licences carry an array of conditions. Stations must meet requirements to include certain levels of Canadian shows and music in their programming schedule. Broadeners must devote a “reasonable amount of time” to coverage of public issues and, to ensure that this coverage is balanced, they must provide an opportunity for contrary points of view to be aired. CRTC regulations forbid licensees from airing “abusive content that … tends to or is likely to expose an individual or group or class of individuals to hatred or contempt on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age or mental or physical disability.”61

A major clash between the CRTC’s mandate and the media’s independence occurred in July 2004, when the commission refused to renew the licence of Quebec City radio station CHOI-FM after fielding dozens of complaints about program content. The CRTC ruled that the station’s owner, Genex Communications, violated broadcast regulations and the terms of its licence by allowing the two hosts of a morning talk show to “use the public airwaves to make personal attacks and to harass, insult and ridicule people.” The hosts described African university students studying in Canada as “sons of plunderers, cannibals” and advocated that hospital staff “pull the plug” on a psychiatric patient. Another complaint came from a female television host who was the target of lewd remarks (and later won $340,000 in damages after suing the station for defamation).62 Genex appealed, claiming that the CRTC ruling amounted to censorship and violated its right to freedom of expression. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the CRTC’s decision in September 2005, ruling that Charter guarantees of “freedom of expression, freedom of opinion and freedom of speech do not mean freedom of defamation, freedom of oppression and freedom of opprobrium.”63 The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in 200764 but the station remained on the air because, by that time, it had been sold to a new owner and relicensed.65

63 Genex Communications Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 283.
64 Genex Communications Inc c Procureur général du Canada et Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes (CRTC), 2007 CanLII 22312 (SCC).
Human Rights Commissions and Freedom of Expression

Canada’s human rights laws are designed to curb public statements so extreme they could incite hatred or contempt against members of minority groups or the groups themselves. While media organizations have been investigated for publishing such statements, action is usually taken against the person or group making the statement, not the messenger. Journalists and columnists who express extreme opinions about minorities face the greatest risk but, as free-expression expert Richard Moon has noted, human rights probes are not triggered “by everyday racist stereotypes and claims.” The focus of these laws is extreme, non-mainstream, and racist expression.66

The Canadian Human Rights Act

Under federal human rights legislation, it is an act of discrimination “to publish or display before the public or to cause to be published or displayed before the public any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation” that “expresses or implies” discrimination or “incites or is calculated to incite others to discriminate.”67 Section 13 of the Act barred individuals or groups from using the telephone or “the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking” to distribute messages likely to expose a person or group to hatred or contempt based on their race, ancestry, religion, and other characteristics. This restriction was later expanded to include material posted to the Internet.68

In 2006, Maclean’s magazine published “The Future Belongs to Islam,” an excerpt from Canadian-born writer and political commentator Mark Steyn’s book America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It.69 In it, Steyn linked the threat of Muslim extremism to the growing size and power of Muslim communities within Western countries. While conceding “not all Muslims are terrorists,” he wrote that “enough are hot for jihad to provide an impressive support network of mosques from Vienna to Stockholm to Toronto to Seattle.”70 The Canadian Islamic Congress lodged complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission, accusing Steyn of discrimination and promoting hatred against Muslims.

The complaint sparked a debate over freedom of speech and whether human rights commissions should have the power to dictate what Canadians can publish and read. “Freedom of speech is most important when it expresses strong disapproval,” observed civil liberties advocate Alan Borovoy, expressing concern that writers and editors were being forced to “look over their shoulder, worried about being charged or even inves-

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67 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 12.
68 Ibid, ss 13(1), (2), and (3). The legislation's application to messages distributed on the Internet was confirmed in Warman v Kulbashian, 2006 CHRT 11.
The Supreme Court of Canada had already taken steps to limit the scope of section 13, ruling in 1990 that it applies only to statements of an “ardent and extreme nature” that express “unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification.”

The Canadian Human Rights Commission ultimately dismissed the complaint against Steyn. While his writing was “polemical, colourful and emphatic” and “obviously calculated to excite discussion and even offend certain readers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike,” the commission conceded his words fell short of the extreme statements its legislation targets. Controversy over the action against Maclean’s led to the passage in 2013 of a private member’s bill that repealed section 13, ending the federal commission’s power to police commentary disseminated on the Internet and via other electronic means. Extreme statements inciting hatred against minorities, however, can be prosecuted as hate crimes under the Criminal Code (see Chapter 12).

**Provincial and Territorial Codes**

Human rights legislation in each province and territory prohibits the publication or public display of material that discriminates against individuals or groups on the basis of race, religion, or other characteristics. These provisions appear to target notices and advertisements but the wording is broad enough to apply to any material published or broadcast, including news and opinions. Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, for example, makes it a human rights violation to “distribute, publish or publicly exhibit a notice, symbol or sign involving discrimination, or authorize anyone to do so.”

Ontario’s legislation, like the federal Act, refers to the publication of a “notice, sign, symbol, emblem, or other similar representation,” and similar wording is used in the codes of New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Prince

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72 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor, [1990] 3 SCR 892.


75 While Yukon’s legislation makes no specific reference to publications, it forbids “systemic discrimination,” defined as “any conduct that results in discrimination.” Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c 116, s 12.

76 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c C-12, s 11.
Edward Island, and Saskatchewan.77 Alberta, British Columbia, and Manitoba add a published “statement” to the list of prohibited acts.78 Human rights codes in Alberta, British Columbia, and the Northwest Territories restrict not only discriminatory publications, but also those likely to expose individuals or groups to “hatred or contempt.”79

Several jurisdictions specify that their human rights restrictions apply to material published in newspapers or broadcast on radio and television or through other media. This is the case in New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. Each of these provinces adds the caveat that these restrictions do not interfere with freedom of speech or the free expression of opinion on any subject.80 Codes in Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and Ontario also contain provisions respecting freedom of speech and protecting opinions expressed in the course of public debate.81 A BC human rights tribunal has concluded that provincial human rights codes do not apply to material disseminated on the Internet because the federal government is responsible for telecommunications.82

Human rights commissions have the power to investigate complaints under these and other provisions that outlaw discrimination. An investigation may lead to a formal inquiry and anyone found to have violated the legislation can be fined or ordered to pay restitution or damages. Courts in Alberta and Saskatchewan have applied the Supreme Court of Canada’s “ardent and extreme” and “detestation, calumny and vilification” tests to assess whether statements violate provincial human rights codes.83 Judges in other provinces are likely to take the same approach, keeping the focus on extreme expressions of hatred and contempt rather than the work of journalists and media columnists.

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77 Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 13(1); Human Rights Act, RSNB 1973, c H-11, s 6(1); Human Rights Code, RSNL 1990, c H-14, s 14(1); Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989, c 214, s 7(1); Human Rights Act, SNu 2003, c 12, s 14(1); Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 12(1); Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1, s 14(1).

78 Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 3(1); Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 7(1); The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175, s 18.

79 Alberta Human Rights Act, s 3(1)(b); Human Rights Code (BC), s 7(1)(b); Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c 18, s 13(1)(c).

80 Human Rights Act (NB), ss 6(1) and (2); Human Rights Code (NL), ss 14(1) and (2); Human Rights Act (NS), ss 7(1) and (2); Human Rights Act (PEI), ss 12(1) and (2); Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, ss 14(1) and (2).

81 Alberta Human Rights Act, s 3(2); Human Rights Act (NWT), s 13(2); Human Rights Code (Ont), s 13(2). An Alberta court, for instance, ruled that a published letter to the editor, warning readers that a “homosexuality machine” was educating children to view homosexuality as morally acceptable, was intemperate and overstated but a legitimate expression of opinion under s 3(2) of the province’s human rights legislation. Lund v Boissoin, 2012 ABCA 300.

82 Elmasry and Habib v Roger’s Publishing and MacQueen (No 4), 2008 BCHRT 378.

83 See e.g. Owens v Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), 2006 SKCA 41, and Boissoin v Lund, 2009 ABQB 592.
Chapter 1  Freedom of Expression in Canada

The following examples of provincial human rights cases will help writers and editors understand where the line is likely to be drawn:

- The Alberta Human Rights Commission dismissed a complaint against the Calgary-based *Western Standard* magazine in 2008, after it reproduced controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. Then-editor Ezra Levant, who termed the images “innocuous,” argued he was asserting his right to freedom of expression, saying “I want my readers to have the right to judge for themselves.” No major Canadian media outlets reproduced the cartoons, citing ethical concerns (see Chapter 13).  

- In 2016 a Quebec human rights tribunal ordered a comedian to pay $42,000 in damages after he mocked a teenager whose face is disfigured due to a genetic condition. The comedian described the young man (who became famous in Quebec after singing for the Pope at age nine) as “ugly” and joked that he had been disappointed to discover he was still alive. In a similar case, British Columbia’s Supreme Court upheld a human rights tribunal’s $15,000 damage award levied on a comic who unleashed “a tirade of ugly words” and insults during an exchange with a lesbian couple in the audience of a comedy club. The judge said the issue was not “the scope of expression in a comedy performance or an artistic performance. It is about verbal and physical abuse that amounts to adverse treatment based on sex and sexual orientation.”  

- In another BC case, a complaint was filed against newspaper columnist Doug Collins, who questioned whether six million Jews died in the Holocaust. A tribunal found Collins and his Vancouver-area paper, *North Shore News*, in violation of the Human Rights Code and ordered them to pay $2,000 in compensation to the complainant.  

- In 2006 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled that an advertisement that quoted Bible passages describing homosexuality as a sin was not discriminatory. The ad included the image of two stickmen holding hands, placed inside a red “not permitted” symbol. A complaint was filed against the man who bought the ad and the Saskatoon *StarPhoenix*, where it appeared. No action was taken against the newspaper but the ad’s creator was found in violation of the Saskatchewan code and ordered to pay damages of $4,500. The Court of Appeal overturned the

84 “Publisher Defends Decision to Reprint Cartoons,” CTV News Online (14 February 2006).
finding and penalty. While the advertisement’s message was “bluntly presented and doubtless upsetting to many,” it did not meet the Supreme Court of Canada’s requirement for the display of “ardent emotions and strong sense of detestation, calumny and vilification.”

- An Alberta human rights inquiry ruled a clergyman, the chair of a group called the Concerned Christian Coalition, had promoted hatred against homosexuals in a letter to the editor published in the Red Deer Advocate in 2002. The letter described homosexuals as a form of “evil” and “wickedness” and called on people to take a stand “against horrendous atrocities such as the aggressive propagation of homo- and bisexuality.” An Alberta judge reversed the finding in 2009, saying the clergyman’s words were “jarring, offensive, bewildering, puerile, nonsensical and
insulting,” but not so extreme as to risk inciting hatred or contempt. A human rights complaint against the Advocate was settled without a hearing, after the newspaper amended its letters policy to prevent publication of statements “likely to expose people to hatred or contempt because of … sexual orientation.”

**Open Courts**

The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a wide definition of the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression and has recognized the crucial role of the media in our democracy. And other than the regulations governing broadcasting, Canada’s media face little direct state intervention in the way they gather and disseminate information. An exception is media access to Canada’s courts. Judges and lawmakers use publication bans and other restrictions to impose limits on news coverage of court proceedings to protect other interests, the most important being the right of persons accused of crimes to have a fair trial. Media organizations have invoked the Charter to challenge these restrictions, leading to a seminal Supreme Court of Canada ruling—*Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp*—that has added new clout to the media’s right to freedom of expression (see pages 25-30 for more on this case).

**The Media as Watchdog**

The right of public access to the courts is meaningless if citizens are unable to exercise that right by monitoring what happens inside the courtroom. Few people have the time or the inclination to attend trials and hearings. Even if they did, the nation’s courtrooms can only accommodate so many people at any given time. Therefore, the public must rely on the media to be its eyes and ears. “Discussion of court cases and constructive criticism of court proceedings is dependent upon the receipt by the public of information as to what transpired in court,” Justice Peter Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada has observed. “Practically speaking, this information can only be obtained from the newspapers or other media.”

The business of the courts, then, must be open to media scrutiny. Journalists fulfill the dual role of informer and watchdog, publicizing how cases unfold while holding accountable the judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and police officers who put the justice system into action. The media’s right of access, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, is clearly guaranteed under the Charter:

Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. … [The Charter] protects the freedom of the press to comment on the courts as an essential aspect of our democratic society. … As a vehicle through which information

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88 *Boissoin v Lund*, supra note 83.

pertaining to these courts is transmitted, the press must be guaranteed access to the courts in order to gather information.90

Yet the rationale for media coverage goes further than the need to keep the system honest. Media coverage shields the justice system from allegations of favouritism and unfairness. News accounts play an important role in apprehending criminals and may prompt people who can implicate or exonerate a suspect to come forward. Witnesses are less likely to perjure themselves if they know their words may reach people who could expose their lies. Litigants may think twice about pursuing dubious claims in the civil courts. Finally, media reports of the sentences that judges mete out for crimes are crucial to the justice system’s goal of deterring others from committing offences.

Limits on Openness
Openness, however, is not absolute. The media’s right to report on the justice system and the right of citizens to attend court proceedings often conflict with competing rights. Restrictions on access to the courts and what journalists can publish about court proceedings will be examined in detail in Chapters 9 and 10.

The Proper Administration of Justice
Restrictions on media access may be justified to protect the administration of justice—that is, ensure that the justice system can perform its function and that justice is done. Consider the example of a child victim of sexual assault who is frightened about testifying in front of spectators and reporters in open court. If the child is too intimidated to clearly describe what happened, the prosecution’s case may collapse and an abuser may go free. A similar scenario could arise in the civil courts; to pursue a lawsuit, a company may have to disclose financial or sales information that could benefit its competitors. To avoid having the information aired in open court, the company may drop the lawsuit and forgo a valid claim for damages. In the case of the reluctant child witness, the restrictions may take the form of an order that only counsel and the defendant be present when the child testifies. Likewise, in the civil case, the judge may grant a request to seal any sensitive financial information filed with the court. In both instances, the goal of these limits is to overcome obstacles that could stand in the way of justice being done.

Privacy Rights
There may be compelling reasons to restrict openness to protect the privacy of those involved in the court process. Judges have the power under the Criminal Code to make an order preventing the media from identifying victims of sexual offences, extortion, or loansharking, as well as witnesses under the age of 18 involved in such cases. These bans are intended to encourage victims, and any young witnesses who support their com-

90 Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra note 39.
plaints, to come forward by shielding them from the embarrassing publicity that such prosecutions often attract. Publication bans are also issued to prevent defence counsel from disclosing confidential medical and psychiatric records or the details of a victim's sexual history. The *Criminal Code* has been amended to extend the right of privacy beyond sex-related offences. Victims of all crimes and any witness testifying in a criminal case can ask a judge for an order restricting publication of their identities.

The Right to a Fair Trial
The Charter guarantees everyone accused of a crime the right to have the allegations against them tested at a trial that is conducted fairly and impartially. If the people serving on the jury were subjected to media reports offering a steady diet of gossip about the crime and slurs on the defendant's character, they would cease to be impartial triers of fact. And if the media were permitted to report freely on the evidence put forward during pre-trial hearings, jurors might come to court having already decided that the person on trial was guilty. To avoid such outcomes and to ensure fairness, judges have the power to ban publication of information that could compromise the defendant's right to a fair trial. In addition, the *Criminal Code* enables prosecutors and defendants to seek a court order delaying publication of evidence revealed at hearings in the pre-trial phase of a prosecution. Media organizations have invoked the Charter to challenge these *Criminal Code* bans, but, for the most part, the courts have found them to be reasonable limits on the right to free expression.

Balancing Rights: The Dagenais Ruling
For all the solemn pronouncements about the value of a free press, and despite the stack of rulings that emphasize the importance of open courts, Canada's judges once tended to put the rights of accused persons ahead of those of the media and public. When asked to choose between a defendant's request for a publication ban and the right of access to court proceedings, judges traditionally erred on the side of caution and granted the ban, giving precedence to fair-trial rights.

All this changed in 1994 after a legal tug-of-war between fact and fiction. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation planned to televise the National Film Board's production of *The Boys of St Vincent*, a gritty made-for-TV drama based on the real physical and sexual abuse of children at Newfoundland's infamous Mount Cashel orphanage. Meanwhile, in Ontario, Lucien Dagenais and three other members of the Christian Brothers—the
Roman Catholic order that ran Mount Cashel—were charged with similar acts of abuse involving children at Ontario training schools where they had taught. Dagenais was the first to stand trial and the Mount Cashel drama was scheduled to air just before the jury was sent out to begin deliberations.

Lawyers for Dagenais and his co-accused appeared before a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice and obtained an injunction to block the CBC from broadcasting *The Boys of St Vincent* anywhere in Canada until all four trials were completed. *The Globe and Mail* was forced to withdraw its TV guide insert for the week, which featured a cover story about the program. The media were even prohibited from reporting that an injunction had been granted. The *Globe* published a terse item, under the headline “Banned,” that cleverly addressed the sweeping nature of the court’s order:

Somewhere in Canada yesterday, a group requested a court ban on the publication/broadcast of a certain work for certain reasons. The court granted the ban on publication/broadcast and, in addition, imposed a ban on reporting the fact of the ban.93

The Ontario Court of Appeal narrowed the scope of the ban, preventing the program from being broadcast in Ontario and by a Montreal-based French-language station that sent its signal into Ontario.94 The injunction was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which produced a landmark ruling in late 1994 that quashed the ban and set new ground rules for the way the courts deal with the media’s right to freedom of expres-

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94 *Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Dagenais* (1992), 12 OR (3d) 239 (CA).
sion.95 By a margin of 6 to 3, the court ruled that an accused person’s right to a fair trial should not trump the media’s right of free expression. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer said these competing rights have equal status under the Charter and must be balanced, not regarded as a winner-take-all “clash between two titans.”96 Courts must avoid a “hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others” when interpreting the Charter and developing the common law.97

Chief Justice Lamer proceeded to set out the rights to be balanced. The Charter entrenches the right of accused persons to a fair trial, and it is in the public interest that suspects are acquitted or convicted at trials that are fair and appear to be fair. As well, the courts have an interest in protecting the reputation of the administration of justice by ensuring that justice is done and seen to be done. The publication ban imposed on The Boys of St Vincent, however, had a profound impact on the right of the film director to express himself, the CBC’s interest in broadcasting the film, the public’s interest in viewing it, and society’s interest in having an important issue—child abuse—publicly exposed and debated.98 But, the chief justice added, these rights are not always in conflict. Persons accused of crimes have an interest in ensuring that there is “public scrutiny of the court process, and all of the participants in the court process.”99

When considering a motion to ban publication of information, Chief Justice Lamer ruled, judges must assess the objectives of a proposed ban and whether its impact on freedom of expression is in keeping with those objectives. He articulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) The salutary [beneficial] effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious [harmful or detrimental] effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.100

Chief Justice Lamer set out additional criteria for a ban. The ban must relate to an important objective and, if granted, the judge must ensure that it is “as limited (in scope, time, content, etc.) as possible.”101 The judge must also consider a range of options, short of banning publication, that would protect the right to a fair trial. The list includes adjourning the trial, holding the trial in another location, sequestering jurors, permitting

96 Ibid at 881.
97 Ibid at 877.
98 Ibid at 879-80.
99 Ibid at 882.
100 Ibid at 878.
101 Ibid at 891.
counsel to question those called for jury duty, and issuing strong instructions to jurors to disregard media reports.\textsuperscript{102}

Note that the \textit{Dagenais test} does not apply to all publication bans, only those where a judge has the discretion, under the common law or under a statute, to impose or deny a ban. The precedent does not apply to mandatory bans—for example, the \textit{Criminal Code}'s ban on publishing the evidence presented at a preliminary hearing, which must be imposed if requested by the defendant.

\textbf{Applying Dagenais}

The \textit{Dagenais} ruling has been described as nothing short of “revolutionary,” enhancing the openness of the courts and giving the media a powerful weapon to fight restrictions on publication and access to the courtroom.\textsuperscript{103} The ruling represents a watershed, a fundamental rethinking of how freedom of expression applies to the courts.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|p{12cm}|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Event} \\
\hline
1752 & Boston printer John Bushell founds the \textit{Halifax Gazette}, the first newspaper published in what would become Canada. \\
1764 & American printers Thomas Gilmore and William Brown found the \textit{Quebec Gazette/La Gazette de Québec}, published in English and French. \\
1765 & The increased cost of paper under the \textit{Stamp Act} forces the \textit{Quebec Gazette} to suspend publication from October 1765 to May 1766. \\
1766 & The Nova Scotia government, displeased with the \textit{Halifax Gazette}'s criticism of the \textit{Stamp Act}, removes Anthony Henry as publisher. \\
1776 & As the American Revolution begins, the Nova Scotia government forbids the “reprinting or Publishing” of “treasonable papers” supporting the rebels. \\
1778 & Quebec’s lieutenant governor censors the \textit{Quebec Gazette}, removing reports critical of the government. \\
1780s & An influx of Loyalist refugees after the Revolution leads to the formation of Upper Canada, New Brunswick, and other colonies. King’s Printers are appointed to publish laws, proclamations, and government-controlled newspapers. \\
1835 & Halifax newspaper editor Joseph Howe is acquitted of seditious libel after appealing to jurors at his trial “to leave an unshackled press as a legacy to your children.” The verdict makes colonial governments wary of using the criminal law to stifle critics. \\
1892 & Parliament adopts a \textit{Criminal Code} that formalizes the offences of defamatory, seditious, and blasphemous libel and creates defences to protect political debate and press freedom. \\
1914-1918 & During the First World War, federal government regulations restrict publication of information considered useful to the enemy. \\
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\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid} at 881.

\textsuperscript{103} Michael R Doody, \textit{Reporting on Adult Courts and Tribunals} (Toronto: Hallion Press, 1995) at 19, 21.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>The Supreme Court of Canada strikes down Alberta laws curtailing freedom of the press, and describes the “right of free public discussion of public affairs” as “the breath of life for parliamentary institutions.”</td>
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<td>1939-1945</td>
<td>The Second World War brings the return of censorship. A network of censors advises news editors on war-related information that can be published.</td>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>The Supreme Court restricts the legal definition of sedition, saying “freedom in thought and speech . . . are the essence of our life.”</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Ottawa introduces a Bill of Rights to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech. It applies only to the federal government and its laws.</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media calls government interference “the gravest potential threat” to press freedom in Canada.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is adopted as part of Canada’s Constitution. Section 2(b) guarantees “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The Supreme Court concludes “a democracy cannot exist without that freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The Supreme Court’s Dagenais ruling calls on judges to limit the use of publication bans and to strike a balance between freedom of the press and a suspect’s right to a fair trial.</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>The Supreme Court strengthens the fair comment defence to defamation, ruling that Canadians “have as much right to express outrageous and ridiculous opinions as moderate ones.”</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>The Supreme Court creates the defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest, which can defeat a libel claim if writers and publishers demonstrate high journalistic standards.</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>The Supreme Court says judges should strive to “protect the media’s confidential sources where such protection is in the public interest,” and demand disclosure of sources only as “a last resort.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Parliament passes the Journalistic Sources Protection Act, Canada’s first press shield law. It makes it less likely that the courts will order journalists to reveal the identity of a confidential source when their reporting serves the public interest.</td>
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The Supreme Court of Canada has put the Dagenais approach to work in other contexts. It has applied the rights-balancing approach to the way that judges use their discretionary power under section 486(1) of the Criminal Code to close a courtroom to the public. As in Dagenais, judges must consider alternatives to excluding the public and, if an exclusion order is granted, ensure that it is as limited in scope as possible. The
benefits of closing the courtroom must be weighed against the principle of openness and the right of free expression.¹⁰⁴

In late 2001 the court revisited the publication ban issue in a pair of rulings (including one known as Mentuck) that rejected sweeping bans on police undercover operations. Declaring that Canada “is not a police state,” the court said the public must be free to scrutinize the tactics used in apprehending suspected criminals. Openness and media scrutiny ensure that trials are conducted fairly and, just as importantly, help to vindicate defendants who are found not guilty by informing the public of the reasons for an acquittal. Because neither ban related to the fair-trial rights of the defendants, the court ruled that judges should apply what are now known as the Dagenais/Mentuck principles when faced with applications for publication bans that could protect or hinder the proper administration of justice.¹⁰⁵ The court has also applied this test to applications for an order sealing confidential information presented in court cases. Judges must weigh free expression and openness against the need to protect other important interests, including commercial interests.¹⁰⁶ The Supreme Court went further in 2005, asserting that “the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to all discretionary court orders that limit freedom of expression and freedom of the press in relation to legal proceedings.” It also ruled that the media can challenge publication bans and access restrictions “at every stage of the judicial process,” including during police investigations and before criminal or other charges are filed. The court’s bottom-line position, that “[i]n any constitutional climate, the administration of justice thrives on exposure to light—and withers under a cloud of secrecy,” bodes well for further media challenges to restrictions on coverage of the justice system.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (Attorney General), supra note 39.
¹⁰⁷ Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 SCR 188 at paras 1, 7, and 8.